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RESPONSE TO THE WORKING GROUP ON
DETERMINING THE BEST INTEREST OF
TIE CHILD
Ann M. Hdralambie*

T

HE consensus reached at the Fordham Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children articulated a subtle
but profound change in the "best interests" debate of the past two
decades. Previously the debate involved two camps: those proposing
that lawyers must advocate the child's position based on the child's
expressed wishes and those proposing that lawyers must advocate the
child's position based on the lawyer's independent determination of
what was in the child's best interests. Often commentators and practitioners designated these competing roles as "attorney" or "counsel"
for the former and "guardian ad litem" for the latter.
In the 1990s, the legal community has shown a tendency to distance
itself from and even reject a paternalistic model of the subjectively
driven guardian ad litem. Taken to its logical conclusion, this trend led
to the adoption of standards by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers' ("AAML Standards") that preclude lawyers from acting
as subjectively driven guardians ad litem in custody cases. Where the
child client is unable to provide direction, the lawyer may not advocate any position at all.2 The AAML Standards view children as
either "impaired" or "unimpaired," 3 with the child's lawyer taking a
position in the case generally only as directed by the unimpaired client.4 The notion of an all-or-nothing impaired/unimpaired status,
however, has been criticized as lacking an empirical basis. 5 Further,
the ramifications of the AAML Standards deny the "impaired" child
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Bar Association Family Law Section to the American Bar Association Center on
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Children and the Law.

1. American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Representing Children: Standards for Attorneys and Guardians ad Litem in Custody or Visitation Proceedings
(1995) [hereinafter AAML Standards].
§§ 2.7-2.13.
2. Id.
3. ld. §§ 2-2.2.
4. Id. §§ 2.3-2.4.
5. See, e.g., Proposed American Bar Association Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 29 Fain. L.Q., Fall 1995, at
375, 379 [hereinafter ABA Draft Standards] (stating in the comment to Standard B-3
that "these standards reject the concept that any disability must be globally deter-

mined"); Ann M. Haralambie & Deborah L. Glaser, Practical and Theoretical

Problems with the AAML Standardsfor Representing "Impaired" Children, J. Am.
Acad. Matrim. Lawyers (forthcoming 1996) (on file with Fordham Law Review).
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any advocacy at all, radically modifying the expectations of a lawyer's
role as zealous advocate.
The proposed ABA Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases ("ABA Draft Standards")
provide that to the extent that the child client cannot or will not express a preference, the lawyer should determine and advocate the client's legal interests.6 The Working Group on Determining the Best
Interest of the Child also used the term "legal interests" to limit the

range of issues about which the lawyer should advocate. 7
While child advocates have objected to being denied the right (and
perceived duty) to advocate positions for even very young clients,8
they have also had to acknowledge their discomfort at being expected
to determine the client's position in the absence of direction from the
child or any expertise in evaluating the child's best interests.9 Critics
of lawyers serving in a guardian ad litem role have pointed out that
such independent determination of interests is antithetical to the

traditional role of lawyers and threatens the rule of law. 10 Commentators are now generally in agreement that the lawyer's subjective opinions, biases, values, and life experiences constitute inappropriate bases
for determining the child's positions."
Some commentators have suggested 'that specialized training may
equip children's lawyers to determine the child's position based on
more objective criteria, even in the absence of direction from the
6. ABA Draft Standards, supra note 5, at 381 (Standard B-4(1)-(2)).
7. Recommendation IV(B)(3)(a) of the Conference defined "legal interest" as
"any interest that the legal proceeding has authority to address." Recommendations of
the Conference on EthicalIssues in the Legal Representation of Children, 64 Fordham
L. Rev. 1301 (1996) (part IV.B.3.a) [hereinafter Recommendations of the Conference].
8. See, e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment"Rethinking the
Role of Lawyers Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 Fordham L. Rev.
1655, 1696-97 (1996) (arguing that children are "rights holders" and may make rights
claims that should be treated seriously); Haralambie & Glaser, supra note 5 (arguing
that children under the age of 12 may be capable of decision making and should not
be presumed "impaired").
9. See Report of the Working Group on Determining the Best Interest of the Child,
64 Fordham L. Rev. 1347, 1349 (1996) [hereinafter Report-DeterminingChild's Best
Interest].
10. See, e.g., AAML Standards, supra note 1, § 2.7 cmt. (arguing that a lawyer
advocating her "own preferred outcome in the name of the child's best interests"
poses a "most serious threat"); Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigmfor Determining the
Role of Counselfor Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1399, 1416 (1996) (noting that a
child client's rights are not necessarily advanced when the lawyer advocates what she
perceives to be the child's best interests).
11. See, e.g., Ann M. Haralambie, The Role of the Child's Attorney in Protecting
the Child Throughout the LitigationProcess, 71 N.D. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1996) (arguing that an attorney's subjective view of the child's best interests is an inappropriate
standard) (on file with Fordham Law Review); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-DirectedLawyering for Children in Child Protective
Proceedings,64 Fordham L. Rev. 1505, 1525-27 (1996) (criticizing the total discretion
model of child representation).
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child. 12 But such training, while it may improve the quality of the substituted choices made, does not answer the fundamental question
about whether substituted decision making is a proper role for a lawyer qua lawyer. Further, the historical debate has questioned whether
and to what extent the lawyer can represent a child as both "counsel"
by
and "guardian ad litem,"'13 potentially conflicting roles mandated
law.' 4
some judicial appointments, state statutes, and case
12. See, e.g., Haralambie, supra note 11; ABA Draft Standards, supra note 5, § B-5
& cmt.; Report-Child'sBest Interests, supra note 9, at 1349 (recommending specialized training); Report of the Working Group on Determining the Child Client's Capacity to Make Decisions, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1339, 1341 (1996) (mandating training to
enable the lawyer to evaluate the child's capacity to make decisions).
13. See Martha L. Fineman, The Role of Guardiansad Litem in Custody Contests,
in Who Speaks for the Children? The Handbook of Individual and Class Child Advocacy 81, 85 (Jack C. Westman ed., 1991); Ann M. Haralambie, The Child's Attorney:
A Guide to Representing Children in Custody, Adoption, and Protection Cases 24-35
(1993); Donald T. Kramer, 1 Legal Rights of Children § 2.25 (2d ed. 1994); Stephen
W. Bricker, Children'sRights: A Movement in Search of Meaning, 13 U. Rich. L. Rev.
661, 666-67 (1979); Catherine M. Brooks, When A Child Needs a Lawyer, 23 Creighton L. Rev. 757, 759 (1990); Howard Davidson, Child Advocacy, 74 A.B.A. J., Dec.
1988, at 119, 119; Howard A. Davidson, The Child's Right to be Heard and Represented in JudicialProceedings, 18 Pepp. L. Rev. 255, 264 (1991); Donald N. Duquette
& Sarah H. Ramsey, Representationof Children in Child Abuse andNeglect Cases: An
Empirical Look at What Constitutes Effective Representation, 20 U. Mich. J.L. Ref.
341, 351-53 (1987); Jinanne S.J. Elder, The Role of Counselfor Children: A Proposal
for Addressing a Troubling Question, 35 Boston B.J., Jan./Feb. 1991, at 6, 6; Brian G.
Fraser, Independent Representationfor the Abused and Neglected Child: The Guardian Ad Litem, 13 Cal. W. L. Rev. 16, 28 (1976); Rebecca H. Heartz, GuardiansAd
Litem in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings: Clarifying the Roles to Improve Effectiveness, 27 Fam. L.Q. 327, 334 (1993); Jacqueline A. Jacobs, Incompetent Clients, 2
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 305, 309 (1988); Linda L. Long, When the Client is a Child: Dilemmas in the Lawyer's Role, 21 J. Fain. L. 607, 609-11 (1982-83); Angela D. Lurie,
Note, Representing the Child-Client: Kids are People Too: An Analysis of the Role of
Legal Counsel to a Minor, 11 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 205, 220-21 (1993); RobynMarie Lyon, Comment, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counselfor
Minors, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 681, 689-93 (1987); Louis I. Parley, Representing Children in
Custody Litigation,J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law., Winter 1993, at 45, 46-47; Sarah H.
Ramsey, Representationof the Child in Child ProtectionProceedings: The Determination of Decision-Making Capacity, 17 Fam. L.Q. 287, 287-88 (1983); James R.
Redeker, The Right of an Abused Child to Independent Counsel and the Role of the
Child Advocate in Child Abuse Cases, 23 Vill. L. Rev. 521, 539-42 (1978); Marvin
Ventrell, The Child's Attorney, 17 Fam. Advoc. 73, 76 (1995); Marvin R. Ventrell,
Rights & Duties: An Overview of the Attorney-Child Client Relationship, 26 Loy. U.
Chi, L.J. 259-60 (1995); Shannan Wilber, Independent Counselfor Children, 27 Faro.
L.Q. 349, 353 (1993); cf. Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 Harv. Educ.
Rev. 487, 495 (1973) (noting the lack of consensus among lawyers regarding the rights
of children and the lawyer's role).
14. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bamthouse, 765 P.2d 610, 612 (Colo. Ct. App.)
(approving attorney's conduct in recommending against following the child's wishes),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1021 (1988); In re Marriage of Kramer, 580 P.2d 439, 443-45
(Mont. 1978) (reversing district court award of custody that failed to take into account
children's wishes but holding that role of appointed attorney is to present children's
best interests to the court); In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614, 632 (Pa. 1983) (criticizing attorney's lack of representation on behalf of the child but suggesting that the attorney
should have submitted the child's preference to the court and explained why he dis-
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Rule 1.14 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 5 ("Model
Rules") discusses the ethical implications of representing parties
under a disability, including the disability of minority. That rule requires lawyers, insofar as is possible, to maintain a normal attorneyclient relationship with a client whose ability, to make adequately considered decisions is impaired. The Model Rules, however, provide no
guidance for how to determine that the client is under a disability or
how to modify the representation to the extent that it is not possible to
maintain a normal attorney-client relationship. This lack of guidance
has allowed lawyers to embrace a subjective judgment guardian ad
litem role without any limits on the individual lawyer's discretion, provoking the increasingly critical questioning of the inherent validity of
the role' itself.
The Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the
Legal Representation of Children 16 ("Recommendations") articulate
a clear, elegant, and satisfying way of resolving the competing
problems. The consensus position rejected the legitimacy of the lawyer's serving in the traditional model role of guardian ad litem, with an
expectation of subjective decision making accompanying appointment. The lawyer functioning as lawyer, however, may determine the
position to be advocated for the child to the extent, but only to the
extent, that the child is impaired (i.e., "under a disability" in the language of Model Rule 1.14). 17 The Recommendations thus reject the
idea that a child's lawyer is something other than a lawyer acting
under traditional ethical mandates. Rather, the Recommendations
provide guidance for applying the authority given by Model Rule 1.14
agreed). In his 1988 Supplementary Practice Commentary to New York's Family
Court Act, art. 2, § 241, Douglas Besharov wrote: "Even after twenty-five years, the
role of 'law guardian' remains ambiguous and subject to controversy. It seems fair to
say, though, that the Legislature used the term to denote something other than simply
a lawyer for the child and something other than the traditional guardian ad litem."
N.Y. Jud. Law § 241 (McKinney 1983), Douglas J. Besharov, Practice Commentary,
cited in Haralambie, supra note 13, at 16 n.7. Arkansas requires the child's attorney
to perform two potentially conflicting duties: "to represent the best interest of the
juvenile and to advocate for the juvenile's articulated wishes." Ark. Code Ann. § 927-316(e)(1) (Michie 1987). Wyoming expects the child's attorney to serve also as
guardian ad litem. Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-211(a) (1977). The Iowa Supreme Court recognized the problem, stating:
We are mindful that in the ordinary lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer's
role is not to determine the client's interest but to advocate the client's interest.... Such a duty may present an ethical dilemma in a juvenile proceeding
where the objective is always the best interest of the child, not the child's
personal objective. We are aware that the unsettled law in this area offers no
clear direction to an attorney faced with such a predicament.
In re J.P.B., 419 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Iowa 1988).
15. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14 (1983) [hereinafter Model

Rules].
16. Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 7, part I.
17. Model Rules, supra note 15, Rule 1.14 (1983).
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to make some independent determinations on behalf of the child
client.
The Report of the Working Group on Allocation of DecisionMaking
provides for an advocacy role even for a lawyer who represents
preverbal children.'" The Report of the Working Group on Determining the Child's Capacity to Make Decisions sets forth a rigorous process by which the lawyer determines a position. That process starts
with the assumption of a client-directed determination and seeks to
limit the lawyer's discretion in substitute decision making, rather than
to expand it. Lawyers will be able to apply the process in a reasonably
objective manner, answering the critics who are concerned with unbridled discretion in child advocates.
In practice, if the child's lawyer has spent the time necessary to understand the child's needs from the child's perspective and to establish
rapport with the child, the range of what constitutes the child's best
available legal interests will be acceptably narrowed. Further, most
children will be receptive to the lawyer's recommendations, precluding the much discussed conflict between the child's expressed position
and his or her best interests.
The bottom line in determining the child client's best legal interests
is taking the time to plumb the context of the child's life and to consider the ramifications of each alternative position as seen through the
child's eyes. Adults can too easily pontificate about a child's best interests while ignoring the day-to-day effect of those decisions in the
child's life. A child's priorities are deserving of respect, at least by
that child's lawyer. For some, a certain degree of physical maltreatment or neglect may be far outweighed by the importance of other
benefits of life with the family: affiliation, continuity of environment,
proximity to friends, activities, and school, availability of pets, and
other needs that the family meets.
Implicit in the less paternalistic view of the role of the child's lawyer
is the need for judges to be judges, and to make independent decisions
based on statutory and case law criteria. A judge cannot merely defer
to the recommendations of the child's lawyer, any more than he or she
can delegate decision making to the social worker or evaluator. If the
strength of the adversary process lies in the full presentation and consideration of different points of view, then giving a greater voice to the
child should not impair either fact finding or decision making.
The Fordham Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children has strengthened the position of those who would
give children a meaningful voice in the legal matters concerning them.
It has also required a newly articulated rigor in limiting the discretion
of the child's lawyer. It may seem paradoxical that at a time when the
18. Report of the Working Group on Allocation of Decision Making, 64 Fordham
L. Rev. 1325, 1334 (part IV).
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field of pediatric law is advancing, with more multidisciplinary training, we should be limiting our discretion. But because we have
learned so much more, including the long-term ramifications of various dispositions, we have finally come to recognize and, most importantly, to respect the wisdom of our child clients.

